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In the third quarter, HGI sold every last share of KRG, a gesture as final as a closing door. The sum-$3.4 million, measured by quarterly averages-was not a whisper but a shout. This departure arrives as the fund shrinks its herds of U.S. equities, retreating to safer pastures. The market, that great and indifferent force, watches with its thousand eyes.

The margins of high finance, like the margins of a fading painting, are filled with quiet disintegration. HGI’s retreat from Vornado-once a titan clasping the skyline-was nothing less than a symbolic shedding of old skin. With a quarter revealing a halving of their assets, one cannot help but consider whether the firm finally perceives the ghost of a rapidly diminishing landscape. A landscape where the familiar, stubborn edifices of Manhattan are bathed in a wan light of waning vitality, where even the most robust structures seem poised for quiet surrender.

In the manner of a painter retreating from a half-finished canvas, HGI Capital Management divested its entire position in Empire State Realty Trust. The sum of $4 million, extracted from a portfolio of $36.4 million, marked the end of a chapter in which the fund had once held 5.4% of its assets in this venerable REIT. The SEC, ever the patient scribe, bore witness to this departure on November 14.

Meros Investment Management’s complete divestment, disclosed in an SEC filing, stripped Worthington Steel from its 43-stock portfolio. This $5.3 million exit merits attention not for its scale, but for what it signals: institutional impatience with cyclical volatility. The S&P 500’s 13% growth contrasts starkly with Worthington’s 18% annual loss-a disparity that demands dissection, not dogma.

Current market dynamics reflect a paradoxical equilibrium: artificial intelligence-driven growth narratives coexist with muted industrial production metrics. This bifurcation warrants rigorous examination against historical benchmarks, particularly given the S&P 500’s entry into an exclusive statistical cohort – only four prior 100-year epochs have demonstrated consecutive annual total returns exceeding 20%.

Well, according to a little SEC filing – which, oddly enough, is supposed to be transparent but more often just shows how people juggle their portfolios – Meros picked up a tiny, little sliver of Azenta’s pie. At quarter’s end, they owned 159,945 shares, worth roughly $4.6 million. That’s about 2% of their total U.S. holdings. To put that into perspective, they’re mostly busy with stocks like DCO, PLYM, MGNI, and others you’ve probably never heard of – unless you’re a masochist who enjoys poring over spreadsheets late at night. Azenta, meanwhile, is trading at $35.05-a far cry from the heady days of over $120 – and lagging behind the S&P’s 13% gain. So, for those counting, Azenta’s got a market cap of about $1.6 billion, revenues just shy of $600 million, a modest net income, and a stock that makes you wonder if the dollar signs were just a mirage.

Here’s what you need to know, dear reader: the game’s rigged, the dice are loaded, and yet we all play anyway. Let’s dissect these two stocks with the solemnity they deserve-or don’t.

Apparently, amid the cluttered chaos of SEC filings, Manatuck Hill decided that piling more money into Zeta was a wise move-adding 415,000 shares to their existing 290,000, bringing their total to a staggering 705,000. As of September 30, those shares were valued at $14 million, which, when you think about it, is a lot of money to sink into a company whose shares now languish at $19.05, battered down by a relentless 26% slide over the last year. It’s like investing in a sinking ship, then somehow deciding to buy more life jackets.